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PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CASES OF 1961
BY CHARLES E. TORCIA*
Assisted by David J. Humphreys and James F. Toohey
AFTER-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Commonwealth v. Tyson.' Relator was convicted of robbery by assault
and force. His motion for a new trial, on the ground that new evidence had
been discovered since the trial which would tend to discredit the victim's
identification of him as the author of the crime, was denied. In affirming,
the appellate court felt that a new trial should not be granted where the
newly discovered evidence merely amounted to a possible basis for the im-
peachment of the credibility of a witness.
COMMONWEALTH'S RIGHT OF APPEAL
Commonwealth v. Melton.2 Defendant on a jury verdict was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. The court en banc
granted defendant's motion for a new trial on the "ground that the aggregate
of untold events happening at trial, including emotional outbursts by the
bereaved husband . . . 'created such an inflammatory atmosphere that the
jury's determination may well have been based upon other than the sub-
stantive factual evidence introduced.' " The Commonwealth appealed. In
dismissing the appeal, this court declared that the Commonwealth only has
a right to appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case "where the
question involved is purely one of law." Since the question presented here-
whether the attending circumstances at the trial were "prejudicially inflam-
matory"-was, according to the court, one of "fact as well as law," the
Commonwealth had no right of appeal.
CORAM NOBIS
Commonwealth v. Whalen.4 Relator's petition, treated as a petition for a
writ of error coram nobis, alleged "after-discovered" evidence to the effect
that another person had confessed to committing the crime for which he
(petitioner) had been convicted and sentenced. The appellate court, on the
opinion of the court below (Alessandroni, P. J.), sustained the dismissal of
* Associate Professor of Law; LL.B., 1954, St. Johns University School of Law;
LL.M., 1961, New York University.
1. 194 Pa. Super. 593, 168 A.2d 785 (1961).
2. 402 Pa. 628, 168 A.2d 328 (1961).
3. Id. at 629, 168 A.2d at 329.
4. 194 Pa. Super. 330, 169 A.2d 349 (1961).
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the petition on the ground that "coram nobis does not lie to permit the review
of a judgment for after-discovered evidence." 5
DELAY IN TRIAL
Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Myers.6 In January 1959, relator was
arrested, taken before a magistrate, formally charged, and committed to a
county prison. In February 1959, he was indicted for conspiracy, rape, ag-
gravated assault, and robbery by violence. In June 1959, he was tried, con-
victed, and sentenced to a prison term. After examination at a diagnostic
center, he was transferred, in September 1959, to the state correctional insti-
tution at Graterford, where he is presently confined. He sought his release
by way of habeas corpus on the ground that "he was denied the speedy public
trial guaranteed to him under Section 9, Article I of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth." As additional support, he pointed to the so-called "two-
term" statute7 which provides that "if such prisoner shall not be indicted and
tried the second term, session or court after his or her commitment . . . he
shall be discharged from imprisonment."'8 Hence, relator concluded, "by the
prosecution delaying the trial for approximately five months," the trial court
was "without jurisdiction to proceed" and all subsequent proceedings were
"null and void." In rejecting relator's argument, the appellate court declared
(quoting from Commonwealth v. Mitchell) : "Our interpretation of the Con-
stitution and our statute permits a prisoner to be discharged from unlawful
imprisonment, but does not permit the guilty to escape prosecution because of
a fortuitous circumstance which delays the trial."9 Since the right to be
discharged existed only prior to trial-and since relator had already been
tried and convicted-the question whether relator "should have been released
pending trial is now moot."
ENTRAPMENT
Commonwealth v. Conway.10 Defendant, who had been convicted of
bookmaking, urged on appeal that the trial judge erred in failing to submit
the question of entrapment to the jury. After examining the two leading
cases, Sorrells v. United States," and United States v. Sherman,12 the court
declared that the defense of entrapment in Pennsylvania "arises only when a
law enforcement officer, by employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that persons not otherwise ready to commit
5. Ibid.
6. 194 Pa. Super. 561, 168 A.2d 796 (1961).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (Supp. 1960).
8. Supra note 6, at 563, 168 A.2d at 797.
9. Id. at 564, 168 A.2d at 797.
10. 196 Pa. Super. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961).
11. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12. 356 U.S. 369 (1938).
[Vol. 66
JUDICIAL HIGHLIGHTS
the criminal act will do so, actually induces such a person to commit the
act.' 1 3 In brief, the defense of entrapment requires: "(1) a defendant not
disposed to commit the crime, and also (2) police conduct likely to entrap
the innocently disposed." Noting that defendant had no prior conviction of
bookmaking and "the defendant's own evidence suggests that considerable
persuasion was used by the law enforcement officer," the court, in reversing,
felt that the defense should have been submitted to the jury. Two judges
dissented.
EXTRADITION
Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Banmiller.14 Petitioner, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, claimed irregularities in connection with his extradition
from Washington, D. C. to Philadelphia where he later pleaded guilty to an
indictment for robbery. In sustaining the dismissal of the petition, the court
observed that no evidence had been offered to substantiate the charge of extra-
dition irregularities. In any event, it was noted, "the entry of a plea and
sentence" constituted a waiver of any such alleged irregularities.
Commonwealth ex rel. Gant.'5 Relator, who had pleaded guilty to
seventeen burglaries and related offenses in 1948 and was sentenced to prison,
claimed by way of habeas corpus that he had been arrested in Brooklyn, New
York and returned to Philadelphia on the burglary charges and had not been
"advised of his rights in extradition proceedings." In sustaining the dismissal
of the petition, the appellate court declared: "Even if relator had been brought
into Pennsylvania without extradition proceedings, he has no standing to
question the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania court to accept a plea of guilty
to an indictment regularly found charging crimes committed in this state."' 6
FIREARMS
Commonwealth ex rel. Curry v. Myers.'7 Petitioner, who allegedly shot
and critically wounded his estranged wife, was indicted on three counts: (1)
assault and battery, aggravated assault and battery, and assault and battery
with intent to murder; (2) commission of a crime of violence while armed
with a firearm; and (3) carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully
carrying a firearm without a license. Convicted on counts (1) and (2) peti-
tioner received consecutive sentences. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceed-
ing the petition was dismissed, but it was felt that the sentence imposed under
the matter alleged in the second count was illegal in that it did not constitute
13. Supra note 10, at 103, 104, 173 A.2d at 779.
14. 195 Pa. Super. 124, 168 A.2d 925 (1961).
15. 195 Pa. Super. 417, 171 A.2d 603 (1961).
16. Id. at 419, 171 A.2d at 605.
17. 195 Pa. Super. 480, 171 A.2d 792 (1961).
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a crime.18 The pertinent statute provided: "If any person shall commit or
attempt to commit a crime of violence when armed with a firearm contrary to
the provisions of this section, he may, in addition to the punishment provided
for the crime, be punished also as provided by this section." 19 According to
the lower court, this language did not create a new crime but rather prevented
the crimes enumerated in the following paragraphs of the section-such as the
crime of carrying a firearm without a license-from merging with the "crime
of violence." The appellate court agreed that no crime as alleged in the second
count existed and vacated the sentence imposed thereunder. Two justices
dissented.
HABEAS CORPUS
Commonwealth ex rel. Baerchus v. Myers.20 Petitioner who had been
convicted of burglary sought his release from imprisonment by way of a writ
of habeas corpus. Noting that petitioner's contentions-inter alia, that his
confession was coerced, that the judge was prejudiced, that the conviction
was obtained as a result of perjured testimony-had not been raised by post-
conviction motion nor had an appeal been taken, the court sustained the dis-
missal of the petition. It was held that habeas corpus was not available to
attack a conviction on the grounds urged, and in any event, it appeared that
the petitioner had been "afforded ample opportunity to demonstrate a denial
of due process" by three previous petitions.
Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Myers.21 By way of habeas corpus,
relator claimed "that his sentence was too severe; that his lawyer incompe-
tently conducted his defense, and that [he] did not receive a fair and im-
partial trial." 22 The court affirmed the dismissal of the petition on the opinion
of the lower court (Guerin, J.), which had declared that while such "reasons
might have been assigned upon a motion for a new trial," they may not be
urged by habeas corpus "which cannot be made the substitute for normal
appellate review."
'23
INSTRUCTIONS OF TRIAL JUDGE
Commonwealth v. Lomax.24 Defendant, who had been tried before a
jury and convicted of the illegal possession and sale of drugs, urged on ap-
peal that the trial judge erred "when he expressed his opinion concerning de-
fendant's veracity and guilt." The court declared that the expression of such
18. The trial judge raised the illegality of the indictment himself. Petitioner's writ
of habeas corpus contained no such contention and was dismissed because the contentions
contained therein were without merit.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1939).
20. 194 Pa. Super. 377, 168 A.2d 754 (1961).
21. 194 Pa. Super. 611, 169 A.2d 584 (1961).
22. Id. at 611, 169 A.2d at 585.
23. 23 Pa. D.&.C.2d 519, 520 (1960).
24. 196 Pa. Super. 5, 173 A.2d 710 (1961).
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an opinion is proper so long as "(1) there is reasonable ground for any state-
ment he may make; and (2) he clearly leaves to the jury the right to decide
all the facts and every question involved in the case, regardless of any opin-
ion of the court thereon." Since the trial judge instructed the jury that "they
were the judges to finally believe or disbelieve the witnesses and to find the
guilt or innocence of the defendant," and since he "cited his reasons for saying
that he did not believe the defendant," it was held that no error was commit-
ted.
Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers.25 Relator, who had been con-
victed of murder in the second degree, contended, by way of habeas corpus,
that he was denied due process because of error in the trial judge's charge.
The pertinent instruction provided: "It may be stated as a general rule that
all homicide ... is presumed to be malicious, that is, murder of some degree,
until the contrary appears in evidence. While it is presumed to be murder
that presumption raises no higher than murder in the second degree. The
burden is upon the Commonwealth to raise it to murder in the first degree,
the burden is on the defendant to lower it."'26 This instruction was held to be
erroneous for the reason that the presumption applies "not to all homicide
but only to felonious homicide." Nevertheless, the writ was denied as this
was, according to the court, matter that should have been raised at the trial
or on appeal. In a concurring opinion Justice Bell maintained that the judge's
charge, when considered as a whole, was free from prejudicial error and for
that reason the writ was properly denied by the lower court. The majority
also took this occasion "to disapprove the use hereafter of any instruction to
the jury on an indictment for murder that all felonious homicide is presumed
to be murder in the second degree." 27 Felonious killings-killings by poison
or lying in wait or committed in the perpetration of one of the enumerated
felonies-are "inherently malicious" and by statute defined as murder in the
first degree. Hence, the court observed, it would be anomalous to assert that
the law presumes such facts to constitute murder in the second degree. While
wilful, deliberate and premeditated killings (which could rise to murder in the
first degree by proving a specific intent to kill) and other killings with malice
but without a specific intent to kill "according to their circumstances would fit
the definition of murder in the second degree: these various conclusions are
reached by facts and inferences, not by any presumption. '28 A disapproval of
the use hereafter of an instruction that refers to defendant's "burden" was also
noted by the court: it felt that "a defendant has no burden whatever."
25. 402 Pa. 451, 167 A.2d 295 (1961).
26. Id. at 453, 167 A.2d at 297.
27. Id. at 454, 167 A.2d at 297.




Commonwealth v. Root.2 Defendant was found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter "for the death of his competitor in the course of an automobile
race between them on a highway." Death resulted when, as uncontradicted
evidence disclosed, the decedent, in attempting to pass defendant, collided
head-on with an oncoming truck. The superior court sustained the conviction
and the supreme court granted allocatur to decide the question "whether the
defendant's unlawful and reckless conduct was a sufficiently direct cause of
the death to warrant his being charged with criminal homicide. °30 The su-
preme court observed that theretofore the tort law concept of "proximate
cause" had been employed in determining responsibility for criminal homicide.
In light, however, of the "marked extension" of that concept in the civil realm,
the court felt that it was no longer useful in the criminal law setting. Accord-
ingly, it took this occasion to abandon it in favor of a narrower test-that of
"direct cause." Henceforth, involuntary manslaughter might be warranted
only where the act is (1) unlawful or reckless, and (2) is the direct cause
of death. However, the court declared, even under the "proximate cause"
yardstick, it could not sustain the conviction. For, under that doctrine, the
"operative effect of a supervening cause would have to be taken into con-
sideration."' Accordingly, it stated that decedent's act of passing when he
was aware of the dangerous condition created by the defendant's reckless
driving was such a supervening cause. The court noted that the superior
court refused to look at decedent's supervening act on the ground that there
could be more than one proximate cause of death, and if defendant's act was
one of the many then he is guilty. This was error, according to the court, as
each act must be considered in applying the "proximate cause" and "super-
vening cause" theories. Justice Bell filed a concurring opinion in which he
advocated the adoption of a new definition of involuntary manslaughter: "In-
voluntary manslaughter is an unintentional and nonfelonious killing of another
person without malice or passion, which results from conduct by defendant
which is so unlawful as to be outrageous, provided such conduct is a direct
cause of the killing."3 2 In this case he concluded that "the unlawful racing by
defendant was not only unlawful, it was outrageous, but it was not a direct
cause, i.e., one of the direct causes, of the killing. 33 Justice Eagen, in dis-
senting, felt that the defendant's unlawful conduct was a direct cause of the
collision.
29. 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
30. Id. at 573, 170 A.2d at 310.
31. Id. at 578, 170 A.2d at 313.
32. Id. at 582, 170 A.2d at 315.
33. Id. at 583, 170 A.2d at 315.
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Commonwealth v. Thomas.34 Defendant was indicted on two counts-
murder and involuntary manslaughter-for the fatal shooting of a nine-year-
old boy. Over defendant's objection, the trial judge permitted the district
attorney to try defendant only on the murder charge. A jury's verdict of
guilty of murder in the second degree followed. The supreme court ruled
that the failure to prosecute for involuntary manslaughter constituted prejudi-
cial error, for the evidence strongly indicated criminal negligence, not malice.
Further, it was observed that the trial judge acted improperly in refusing
to explain to the jury the difference between involuntary manslaughter and
murder. His charge gave the jury "the impression that the defendant must
be found guilty of murder, or else be set free." This was not so, the court
noted, for he could still be tried for involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly,
the court reversed and ordered a new trial-one justice dissented.
JURY
Commonwealth v. Clark.A5 Defendants were found guilty of murder in
the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. At the trial, it appeared
that the jury retired to deliberate at 5:37 p.m. At 2:00 a.m. the next morning
a verdict of first degree murder was returned. When, however, a poll of the
jury disclosed that one of the jurors was not in accord with the verdict, the
jury was sent back, over the defendant's objection, for further deliberation.
The jury returned at 4:12 a.m. and declared that they were "hopelessly
deadlocked." It further appeared that the jury was confused and it asked the
court for guidance. After a brief discussion the jury was sent back at 4:17
a.m. Finally, the verdict of guilty was rendered at 5:25 a.m. In reversing
and remanding for a new trial, the appellate court declared that the trial judge
"should have adjourned the jury's deliberations at 4:17 a.m. in order to have
minimized the possibility of a verdict which was the product of impatience,
fatigue and confusion." Commonwealth v. Moore,8 6 where it was held to be
within the "trial judge's discretion to direct a jury to deliberate through the
night," was distinguished on the ground that there was no indication of con-
fusion. In the instant case, however, there was "utter confusion" and the
trial judge "did not seriously endeavor to dispel this disorder and confusion
other than by terse and unilluminating advice." Accordingly, the appellate
court remarked: "The trial court obviously abused its discretion when at
4:17 a.m. it ordered a confused and overworked jury to continue its delibera-
tions."
Commonwealth v. Tyson.37 Defendant, who was convicted by a jury of
34. 403 Pa. 553, 170 A.2d 112 (1961).
35. 404 Pa. 143, 170 A.2d 847 (1961).
36. 398 Pa. 198, 157 A.2d 65 (1959).
37. 194 Pa. Super. 593, 168 A.2d 785 (1961).
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robbery by assault and force, contended on appeal that his "rights were in-
fringed by the court and the district attorney in permitting a member of the
State Police to sit at counsel table and assist the district attorney in the selec-
tion of the jury."38 As the court saw it, there was no indication of how de-
fendant's rights were infringed by such action and "the district attorney was
entitled to use any information the officer could furnish in assisting him with
the proper preparation and presentation of the case." 39
PAROLE
Commonwealth ex rel. Godfrey v. Banmiller.4° Relator while on parole
committed a burglary and was returned to the penitentiary to serve the bal-
ance of the sentence remaining when he was paroled-three years and seven
months. After pleading guilty to the burglary indictment, relator was sen-
tenced to five to ten years "to run concurrently with sentence now being
served." Some eight years and seven months later he was again placed on
parole. He violated this parole and was returned to serve the balance of the
sentence imposed for the burglary conviction-which was five years according
to the prison officials. In his petition for habeas corpus, relator--demanding
his discharge from further imprisonment-argued that the time remaining was
only one year and five months (which time had elapsed) since the sentencing
judge had specified that his sentences were to run concurrently. In the alter-
native he urged that if the imposition of concurrent sentences was improper
"the case should be remanded to the lower court for the imposition of a
correct legal sentence in accordance with the sentencing judge's intention."
41
The appellate court in affirming the dismissal of the petition referred to the
statute42 which regulates the imposition of new penalties on parole violators.
It noted that this statute "has frequently and repeatedly been construed by the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania to mean that if a person commits a crime
while on parole, he must serve the new sentence in addition to the back time,
regardless of the intention of the sentencing judge. The manner and order of
service of imprisonment having been specified by law, the courts are powerless
to change it.4 3 Hence, the court observed, while the term of imprisonment
imposed was legal, "the additional words stipulating concurrent operation
were illegal, of no effect and properly disregarded by the prison and parole
authorities."
Commonwealth ex rel. Yanczak v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary.4 4 Peti-
38. Id. at 599, 168 A.2d at 788.
39. Id. at 600, 168 A.2d at 788.
40. 404 Pa. 401, 171 A.2d 755 (1961).
41. Id. at 403, 171 A.2d at 756.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 305 (Supp. 1960).
43. Supra note 40, at 404, 171 A.2d at 757.
44. 194 Pa. Super. 327, 169 A.2d 120 (1961).
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tioner, while on parole from a Pennsylvania prison, committed a federal
offense for which he was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary. By habeas
corpus, petitioner contended that the surrendering by the state authorities of
his person to the federal authorities consituted a waiver by the state of any
further right to hold him. Hence he could not be compelled by the state to
serve the balance of his sentence when released from the federal penitentiary.
In affirming the dismissal of the petition, the court adopted the opinion of
the lower court (Waters, J.) to the effect that there was "no authority for
such contention."
PERJURY
Commonwealth ex rel. Rook v. Myers.45 Petitioner had pleaded guilty
to an indictment for murder. At a hearing to determine the degree of murder
and to fix the penalty the court found the petitioner guilty of murder in the
first degree and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Subsequently, by way of
habeas corpus, petitioner claimed that at the hearing "he was denied his con-
stitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the laws" in that the
prosecutor used "false, untrue, conflicting perjured evidence and testimony."
The supreme court, on the opinion of the lower court (Troutman, J.), af-
firmed the denial of the writ. While, the court noted, there were "some dis-
crepancies in the testimony of several of the witnesses," there was "no indica-
tion whatsoever of even a suspicion of perjury." As the court saw it, "a mere
variance in testimony, or the fact that a witness may have made contradictory
statements, goes to the question of the credibility of the witness but does not,
in itself, indicate perjury on the part of the witness, or that defendant was
convicted on perjured testimony."
46
POLYGRAPH TEST
Commonwealth ex rel. Hunter v. Banmiller.47 Relator had been con-
victed in a non-jury trial of aggravated robbery and sentenced to prison. No
appeal was taken, but by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus relator
complained that "the results of a polygraph or 'lie detector' test were allegedly
considered by the trial court in determining his guilt."'48 In sustaining the dis-
missal of the petition, the appellate court observed that while a polygraph
test or the results thereof "is not judicially acceptable," there was no evidence
"that such test was admitted or considered by the trial court in the disposition
of the trial."49 Indeed, when the trial judge found the relator guilty, he said:
"I make that adjudication on the basis of the evidence without reference to
45. 402 Pa. 202, 167 A.2d 274 (1961).
46. Id. at -, 167 A.2d at 276.
47. 194 Pa. Super. 448, 169 A.2d 347 (1961).
48. Id. at 450, 169 A.2d at 348.
49. Id. at 451, 169 A.2d at 348.
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the results of the lie detector test." 50 In any event, the court noted, even if
the allegation were true, such a trial error cannot be raised by habeas corpus.
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
Commonwealth v. Harris.51 Defendant had been found guilty of carrying
concealed deadly weapons and of carrying a concealed firearm without a
license. Immediately consequent upon the rendition of the verdict, defendant's
counsel was required to argue his post-trial motions-which motions were
denied. The appellate court condemned the requirement of a post-trial argu-
ment immediately after the verdict. It felt that counsel should have "the
benefit of the transcribed testimony and proper time to prepare his reasons
and argument in support of his motions. ' 52 However, it affirmed the con-
viction on the ground that no harm had been visited upon the defendant in
that he had been allowed to raise all alleged errors irrespective of whether
they had been urged below.
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Commonwealth v. Burger.6 Defendant, who had been convicted of
burglary, urged on appeal that "he was proceeded against by 'witnesses and
evidence' upon which he was not given a preliminary hearing. ' 54 In affirming
the conviction, the court declared that, at the preliminary hearing, "it was only
necessary for the Commonwealth to show a prima facie case." 55 Defendant
was not entitled "to be confronted with all the Commonwealth witnesses and
evidence." It was noted that he could have obtained "information by a bill
of particulars."
Commonwealth v. Davis.5 6 Defendant had pleaded not guilty before a
justice of the peace to a complaint of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor and waived the preliminary hearing.
After having been indicted and convicted at a jury trial, defendant appealed
contending that he "could not properly waive a preliminary hearing." The
court adopted the lower court's opinion (Biester, J.) to the effect that the
"right to be heard at a preliminary hearing is not self-executing and must be
demanded." Hence, it was felt, such a right may properly be waived.
50. Ibid.
51. 195 Pa. Super. 606, 171 A.2d 850 (1961).
52. Id. at 612, 171 A.2d at 853.
53. 195 Pa. Super. 175, 171 A.2d 599 (1961).
54. Id. at 180, 171 A.2d at 602.
55. Ibid.




Commonwealth v. Rucker.57 Defendant had been convicted of murder
in the first degree and the penalty fixed at death. Prior to the guilty verdict
the court permitted evidence of defendant's prior convictions for the purpose
of fixing the penalty without indicating "the sentences which were imposed
on such prior convictions." This, it was held, did not constitute error. Two
justices dissented.
PRISONERS
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller.58 Petitioner, a prisoner,
claimed by way of habeas corpus that he lost weight, suffered from vertigo,
and was "nearing a state of neuropsychosis." The relief sought was "proper
medical attention." His claim to redress was predicated upon the eighth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States "which proscribes cruel
and unusual punishment." 59 While the appellate court observed-in affirm-
ing the dismissal of the petition-that the eighth amendment "does not apply
to the states," it preferred to ground its decision upon the proposition that "it
is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline
of prisoners in penitentiaries." 60
Commonwealth ex rel. Reed v. Maroney.61 Relator was convicted of
burglary and sentenced to an indeterminate term in the State Correctional
Institution at Camp Hill-formerly called the Pennsylvania Industrial School
-an institution for young offenders. He was later transferred to the State
Correctional Institution at Graterford, and from that institution to the State
Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh-these institutions were formerly
known as "penitentiaries." By habeas corpus relator questioned the power
of the Deputy Commissioner for Treatment to make such transfers. The lower
court ordered relator's return to the institution at Camp Hill. The appellate
court, in reversing that order and giving effect to the transfers, declared that
"when the legislature gave the Deputy Commissioner for Treatment authority
to make transfers from any state institution under the control of the Depart-
ment of Justice, it intended to include the institution at Camp Hill among such
institutions. ' 62 It noted that the school at Camp Hill "is geared to the less
hardened offender between the ages of 15 and 23" and that an "intolerable
situation" would be created "by making impossible the removal of the serious
troublemakers."
57. 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732 (1961).
58. 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1961).
59. Id. at 567, 168 A.2d at 794.
60. Id. at 568, 168 A.2d at 794.
61. 194 Pa. Super. 514, 168 A.2d 800 (1961).




Commonwealth v. Meszaros.63 Defendant, who had been charged, inter
alia, with tending to corrupt the morals of a female child under the age of
eighteen years, applied, during his trial, for a continuance predicated upon the
absence of a witness who would testify to the bad reputation of the prosecu-
trix. This was denied and his conviction followed. Upon appeal, the court
stated that "an application for a continuance of a case is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge and in the absence of an abuse of discretion
the action thereon will not be disturbed." 4 Finding that there was no such
abuse, the appeal was quashed. In any event, it was noted, "evidence relating
to reputation for chastity, if offered, would have been incompetent." The
court observed: "We see no reason why evidence of bad reputation should not
be treated the same as evidence showing consent of the minor."
RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Commonwealth v. Rucker.65 Prior to the Split-Verdict Act66 the defend-
ant was convicted of murder in the first degree with penalty of death. On
appeal, defendant claimed that due process was violated in that the trial judge
allowed evidence of his prior convictions "for the purpose of affecting the
penalty" prior to a "verdict of guilty." His claim was rejected on the ground
that the Split-Verdict statute "will not be applied retroactively."
Commonwealth ex rel. Hough v. Maroney.67 Relator, along with two
accomplices, participated in a robbery during which an off-duty policeman
was fatally shot. After pleading guilty he was convicted of murder in the first
degree and sentenced to death-this was later commuted to life imprisonment.
Although it was not clear whether the death-dealing bullet came from a rob-
ber's gun or from the gun of one of the policemen who attempted to stop the
felons, the court found that it was necessary only that the fatal shot had been
fired "in aid of or in resistance to the perpetration of the felony. '68 Ten years
later, Commonwealth v. Redline69 was decided. Relator argued that his guilty
plea was entered in the "mistaken belief that the fatal shot had been fired by
his co-conspirator." Accordingly, he urged a review of his case at which time
the court would apply the "new felony murder rule" under which, as he saw
it, his conviction could not be sustained. In affirming the lower court's dis-
missal of the petition, the supreme court ruled that the Redline decision would
not be given retroactive effect.
63. 194 Pa. Super. 462, 168 A.2d 781 (1961).
64. Id. at 463, 168 A.2d at 782.
65. 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732 (1961).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1959).
67. 402 Pa. 371, 167 A.2d 303 (1961).
68. Id. at 375, 167 A.2d at 306.




Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers.70 Petitioner, who had been
convicted of robbery, claimed by way of habeas corpus that "he was without
benefit of counsel at the preliminary hearing." On the opinion of the court
below (Shelley, J.), the appellate court affirmed the denial of the petition. It
was observed: "The law does not require that a person arrested, even though
on a charge of murder, must be provided with counsel as soon as he is taken
into custody, or prior to indictment or arraignment."7 1
Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell.7 2 Relator and his brother
had been tried and convicted of sodomy. By way of habeas corpus he con-
tended that the court's appointment of relator's personal attorney as co-
defendant's counsel constituted "such a conflict of interest as to deprive him
of being heard by his counsel." In sustaining the denial of the petition, the
appellate court declared that the relator must show "more than just the con-
flict of interest." He had to show that the conflict "resulted in such ineffec-
tive and improper representation as to result in basic and fundamental error."
The requisite showing had not been made. Two judges dissented.
Commonwealth ex rel. Simon v. Maroney.73 Petitioner, some twenty
years after having been convicted of rape and robbery, contended by way of
habeas corpus that due process had been violated in that the trial judge had
failed to provide him with counsel. It appeared that petitioner, at that time,
"had been told that the court would assign him a lawyer and that he had not
requested that one be appointed." It also appeared that he was eighteen years
of age, had an I.Q. of 59, and was (and is) recognized as a "potentially
dangerous person of high moron intelligence." In sustaining the denial of the
petition, the appellate court alluded to the principle that "there is no lack of
due process in the failure to appoint counsel in a noncapital case unless it is
established that for want of benefit of counsel an ingredient of unfairness
operated in the process that resulted in the prisoner's sentence." 74 "Youth"
and "low mentality," the court felt, do not per se establish the requisite un-
fairness-and no additional evidence of unfairness had been shown. One
judge dissented.
RIOT
Commonwealth v. Abney.75 Following a high school football game in
Norristown, a group of boys "charged into the visiting color guards and
70. 194 Pa. Super. 452, 169 A.2d 319 (1961).
71. 23 Pa. D.&.C.2d 397, 401 (1960).
72. 195 Pa. Super. 277, 171 A.2d 819 (1961).
73. 195 Pa. Super. 613, 171 A.2d 889 (1961).
74. Id. at 616, 171 A.2d at 890.
75. 195 Pa. Super. 317, 171 A.2d 595 (1961).
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band members, knocking at least one girl to the ground.' 76 A number of
other students were also attacked. Fourteen boys were found guilty of partici-
pating in a riot. Five of the defendants appealed. Since the pertinent statute
did not define riot, the common law had to be consulted. The court defined
riot as a "tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons as-
sembled and acting with a common intent; either in executing a lawful private
enterprise in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, or in
exercising an unlawful enterprise in a violent and turbulent manner."'7 7 De-
fendants argued that there was no evidence that they "assembled and acted
with a common intent." In rejecting their plaint, the court observed: "Even
though some of the rioters may have attacked their victims because they
attended a different school, and others may have attacked their victims be-
cause they were of a different race, the intent of all the participants, as demon-
strated by their conduct, was to act in a violent and turbulent manner. That
intent was common to all."'78 And, since the "defendants were at approxi-
mately the same place at the same time engaging in the same type of unlawful
conduct,"'79 the defendants had "assembled."
"SPLIT-VERDICT" STATUTE
Commonwealth v. McCoy.8 0 Defendant, who shot and killed the owner
of a grocery store in the course of a robbery, was found guilty of murder in
the first degree. As required by the so-called "Split-Verdict Act," a hearing
was held to determine whether the penalty should be death or life imprison-
ment. The jury fixed the penalty at death. Defendant claims error in that at
the hearing, "the victim of a prior armed robbery, to which the defendant had
pleaded guilty, was permitted by the court to testify concerning the circum-
stances of that crime."' The supreme court felt that the admission in evi-
dence of the prior robbery conviction was proper, but that the victim's testi-
mony describing "The circumstances attending its perpetration and the force
and violence to which the defendant had subjected him"8 2 was "improper and
should not have been admitted." In light, however, of the "heinous and cold-
blooded killing"-"McCoy, without provocation of any kind, aimed his gun
at Sabelli's face and shot him at a range of about 18 inches '"83 -the court felt
that the improper testimony could not have "played any essential part in the
76. Id. at 319, 171 A.2d at 597.
77. Id. at 321, 171 A.2d at 597, 598.
78. Id. at 322, 171 A.2d at 598.
79. Ibid.
80. 405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961).
81. Id. at 27, 172 A.2d at 796.




fixing of the penalty."8 4 Accordingly, it viewed the error as "clearly harm-
less" and as not warranting a new trial. Two justices dissented.
TAPE RECORDING
Commonwealth v. Hart.85 Defendant was found guilty of murder in the
first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that
the court erred "in admitting into evidence the transcribed testimony of a
tape recording" of parts of his confession which had been made after arrest
to an assistant district attorney. It appeared that, when he confessed, he had
no knowledge that a recording was being made. The stenographic transcrip-
tion of the recording was admitted into evidence by way of the stenographer's
testimony in rebuttal of defendant's "fabrications." In affirming, the appellate
court alluded to Commonwealth v. Bolish0 where it was said that "tape
recordings are admissible in evidence when they are properly identified and
are a true and correct reproduction of the statements made, and when the
voices are properly identified. 87 It noted that defendant's trial counsel had
said that "he did not wish to hear the tape recording but believed the stenog-
rapher's notes were accurate and she was truthful."
TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE
Commonwealth v. Pressel.88 On appeal from his burglary and larceny
convictions, the defendant urged that the trial judge erred in refusing to
charge that the "testimony of one accomplice may not be used to corroborate
the testimony of another accomplice." This, the court held, was "reversible
error."
WITNESSES
Commonwealth v. Emmel.89 Defendant, who had been convicted of
cheating by fraudulent pretenses, urged on appeal that the trial judge erred
in allowing testimony by witnesses whose names had not been endorsed on
the indictment. This contention was based upon a statutory provision ° which
regulates proceedings before a grand jury and requires the endorsement of
the prosecutor's name on the indictment. The court held that the defendant's
contention was without merit as the "requirement that the prosecutor's name
be endorsed on the indictment" did "not require that all names of witnesses
be endorsed thereon who are necessary to make out a case for conviction." 91
84. Ibid.
85. 403 Pa. 652, 170 A.2d 851 (1961).
86. 381 Pa. 500, 524, 113 A.2d 464, 476 (1955).
87. Supra note 85, at 660, 170 A.2d at 855.
88. 194 Pa. Super. 367, 168 A.2d 779 (1961).
89. 194 Pa. Super. 441, 168 A.2d 609 (1961).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 262 (1930).
91. Supra note 89, at 445, 168 A.2d at 611.
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It noted, however, that our appellate courts have never squarely met the ques-
tion of "whether a person whose name has not been endorsed on the indict-
ment as a witness is disqualified from testifying at the time of trial.
' 92
Unable to find "statutory authority or judicial precedents in this Com-
monwealth which prohibit the Commonwealth from calling additional wit-
nesses to testify whose names were not endorsed on the indictment, 9 3 the
court concluded that such a prohibition would constitute an unjust restriction
upon the state.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
